Timothy Westmyer and Yogeshi Joshi of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University have a blog post the The Dimplomat arguing that the India-Pakistan nuclear experience sugggests that South Korea would not improve its defense by seeking its own nuclear capabilities:
The South Asian case is well suited for the Korean Peninsula. First, both South Asia and the Koreas represent a conflict dyad where one state is a status-quo power (India, South Korea) and the other revisionist (Pakistan, North Korea). If Pakistan wants to assimilate Kashmir from a rather satisfied India, North Korean goals have ranged from uniting the peninsula under its leadership to reversing South Korea’s dominance in the region. Second, both Pakistan and North Korea have dovetailed brinksmanship into their respective conventional and nuclear strategies. On the other hand, India and South Korea practice strategic restraint in dealing with their neighbors. Third, conflicting states have divergent identities in both cases. If Pakistan professes to be a Muslim state vis-à-vis the secular but Hindu-majority India, North Korea prides itself on its Junche/communist identity against the liberal democratic South Korea. Fourth, compared to India and South Korea, decision-making in both Pakistan and North Korea is concentrated in fewer hands, which derive much of their legitimacy from opposition to an outside force (Pakistan-India, DPRK-ROK/U.S.). Lastly, both Pakistan and North Korea are weaker states in terms of conventional firepower. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was a revisionist power with a massive conventional force, the revisionist tendencies of Pakistan and North Korea, both conventionally weaker states, require instability at the strategic nuclear level to provoke without prompting retaliation.
Therefore, the South Asian conflict dyad portends a grim future for a possible nuclear South Korea since provocations would likely continue. Whatever Seoul may hope to gain in deterrence benefits, may be outweighed by loss of international standing and security. In addition, unlike South Asia where the United States may try to serve as neutral intermediary during a crisis, Washington is an active party to the conflict in the Koreas due to troop deployments in ROK and its formal security alliance. The worry that instability at the conventional level will cause instability at the nuclear level to escalate motivates the United States to press for calm and an end to hostilities – including retaliation – after a provocation before the attacked party has a chance to respond. Seoul could expect similar pressure should North Korean provocations occur against a nuclear-armed South.
The U.S. nuclear umbrella aims to provide South Korea with a measure of protection against DPRK aggression that neither Pakistan nor India enjoys. North Korean leaders must calculate the willingness of the United States to respond with its nuclear stockpile should Pyongyang attack South Korea with nuclear or large-scale conventional forces. North Korea still chooses to engage in a range of provocations – short of full-scale invasion or nuclear weapon use – despite this umbrella. The experience of India under the instability-instability paradox demonstrates that Seoul should not expect for DPRK provocations to radically diminish simply because nuclear bombs in the region have South Korean flags painted on the side.
Read it all here. What do you think?
Charles A. Blanchard
General Counsel
United States Air Force